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Abstract—This paper considers a class of wireline networks,
derived from the well-known butterfly network, over which
two independent unicast sessions take place simultaneously. The
main objectives are to understand when network coding type of
operations are beneficial with and without security considerations
and to derive the ultimate gains that cooperation among sources
and sinks can bring. Towards these goals, the capacity region
of the butterfly network with arbitrary edge capacities is first
derived. It is then shown that no rate can be guaranteed over this
network under security considerations, when an eavesdropper
wiretaps any of the links. Three variants of the butterfly network,
such as the case of co-located sources, are analyzed as well and
their secure and non-secure capacity regions are characterized.
By using the butterfly network and its variants as building blocks,
these results can be used to design high-throughput achieving
transmission schemes for general multiple-unicast networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The focus of this work is on a class of wireline networks,
derived from the famous buttefly network, over which two
independent unicast sessions take place simultaneously. Our
goal is two-fold: (i) we seek to understand when network
coding type of operations are beneficial with and without
security considerations and (ii) we aim to find the ultimate
gains that cooperation among sources and sinks can bring.
The characterization of the capacity of multiple-unicast
wireline networks is a long-standing open problem, even for
the two-unicast network. In particular, in [1] the authors proved
that solving the two-unicast problem (for general rate pairs) is
as hard as solving the k-unicast problem, with k ≥ 3. For a
general two-unicast network with integer edge capacities, the
authors in [2] derived necessary and sufficient conditions to
achieve the point (1, 1). However, the assumption of integer
edge capacities is crucial and the result does not appear to
easily generalize to obtain the conditions for achieving other
points, such as (2, 2). Different from muticast networks for
which linear network coding suffices for capacity character-
ization [3], it is proved to be not sufficient for the case
of multiple-unicast networks [4], even for the two-unicast
problem [1]. This fact led to the design of several suboptimal
transmission strategies. For example, in [5] the authors de-
signed achievable schemes for general networks by using as a
building block the famous butterfly network with uniform edge
capacities, for which XORing based operations are optimal.
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Since the problem of characterizing the capacity of multiple-
unicast networks is open, to the best of our knowledge, the
case of secure communication has not been analyzed. For
multicast traffic, in [6] the authors considered uniform edge
capacities and showed that the cut-set bound is tight, when a
passive eavesdropper has access to any k channels. Recently,
in [7] a more general case was considered where edges are
of arbitrary capacities; however, for this scenario the cut-set
bound is not tight and hence the problem remains open even in
the single unicast case. Thus, it is not surprising that no work
considered the case of security for multiple-unicast scenarios.
In this paper, we analyze the celebrated butterfly network
in Fig. 1, where the edge capacities are arbitrary. We first
characterize its capacity region without security constraints,
by designing a scheme that achieves the generalized network
sharing outer bound derived in [8]. We then prove that secure
communication is not possible over this network, when a pas-
sive eavesdropper wiretaps any of the links. We finally derive
secure and non-secure capacity results for other three two-
unicast networks derived from the butterfly network, namely:
(i) the case of co-located sources in Fig. 2; (ii) the case of
co-located sinks in Fig. 3; (iii) a modified version of the
butterfly network in Fig. 4. On the one hand, these results, by
using the butterfly network and its variants as building blocks,
can be used to design high-throughput achieving transmission
schemes for general multiple-unicast networks with and with-
out security considerations. On the other hand, the results here
presented provide network examples for which coding across
sessions is not necessary in absence of security, but it becomes
of fundamental importance under security constraints. This
observation is in line with our previous work in [9] where we
proved that network coding type of operations (which are not
beneficial in absence of security) are crucial for characterizing
the secret capacity region of three two-unicast networks with
erasure channels. Finally, the capacity results here derived shed
light on the ultimate gains that can be achieved by allowing
cooperation among the two sources or the two destinations.
In Section II we define our setup. In Section III we
derive our main result, namely we characterize the capacity
for the four networks in Table I with and without security
considerations. Finally, in Section IV we draw conclusions
and we briefly discuss how the results presented in this work
can be used to design high-throughput achieving transmission
schemes for a general multiple-unicast network.
II. SETUP
A wireline network is represented by a directed acyclic
graph G = (V , E), where V is the vertex (node) set and E
is the set of the directed edges. Each edge e ∈ E represents a
noiseless orthogonal channel of capacity Ce. If an edge e ∈ E
connects a node i to a node j, we refer to node i as the tail
and to node j as the head of the edge e. For each node v ∈ V ,
we define I(v) as the set of all incoming edges of node v and
O(v) as the set of all outgoing edges of node v.
For a two-unicast system, there are two source nodes S1
and S2 and two sink (destination) nodes D1 and D2. These
source and destination nodes can be co-located, i.e., the two
sources or/and the two destinations can be gathered together
in a single node. Each source has an independent message
that has to be communicated to the corresponding destination.
We are interested in the rates at which these messages can be
reliably communicated with and without security constraints.
Source Si, i ∈ [1 : 2] has a message Wi that has to be
reliably decoded at node Di. The messages W1 and W2 are
independent, uniformly drawn from a finite alphabet set and
are of q-ary entropy rates R1 and R2, respectively. Each chan-
nel is a discrete noiseless channel accepting alphabets over Fq.
The symbol transmitted (respectively, received) over n channel
uses on edge e ∈ E is denoted as Xne (respectively, Y ne ).
Clearly, since channels are noiseless, Yei = Xei, ∀i ∈ [1 : n].
Definition 1. A rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable
if there exist a block length n, a set of encoding functions
fe, ∀e ∈ E , such that
Xne =


fe (W1,W2) if tail(e) = {S1, S2}
fe (W1) if tail(e) = {S1}
fe (W2) if tail(e) = {S2}
fe ({Y
n
ℓ : ℓ ∈ I(tail(e))}) otherwise
,
and a set of two decoding functions φj for j ∈ [1 : 2], such
that destination Dj can decode Wj with high probability, i.e.,
Pr (φj ({Y
n
ℓ : ℓ ∈ I (Dj)}) 6= Wj) < nǫn, ∀ǫn > 0.
We are also interested in finding the rate pairs at which the
two messages W1 and W2 can be communicated securely. In
particular, we assume that a passive eavesdropper wiretaps one
channel, which one exactly is not known. This assumption is
equivalent to have one eavesdropper on every link, but these
eavesdroppers do not cooperate among themselves. We let
Zne , e ∈ E be the symbol received by the eavesdropper on edge
e over n channel uses. Clearly, Xei = Yei = Zei, ∀i ∈ [1 : n].
We also assume that for j ∈ [1 : 2], Sj has an independent
and infinite source of randomness Θj .
Definition 2. A rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be securely
achievable if there exist a block length n, a set of encoding
functions fe, ∀e ∈ E such that
Xne =


fe (W1,W2,Θ1,Θ2) if tail(e)={S1, S2}
fe (W1,Θ1) if tail(e)={S1}
fe (W2,Θ2) if tail(e)={S2}
fe ({Y
n
ℓ : ℓ ∈ I(tail(e))}) otherwise
,
and a set of two decoding functions φj for j ∈ [1 : 2],
such that destination Dj can reliably decode the message
Wj (see Definition 1) and such that ∀e ∈ E and ∀ǫn > 0
I (W1,W2;Z
n
e ) < ǫn (strong secrecy requirement).
III. MAIN RESULT
In this section we derive the capacity region with and
without security constraints for the four 2-unicast networks
reported in Table I. In particular: (i) the network in Fig. 1
is the classical butterfly network, which we refer to butterfly
network 1; (ii) the network in Fig. 4 is a modified version
of the classical butterfly network, which we refer to butterfly
network 2; (iii) the network in Fig. 2 is a particular case of the
butterfly networks in Fig. 1 and Fig. 4 (with the role of C4 and
C5 swapped) when the sources are co-located; (iv) the network
in Fig. 3 is a particular case of the butterfly networks in Fig. 1
and Fig. 4 when the destinations are co-located. It is worth
noting that when the two sources in Fig. 1 are merged to get
the network in Fig. 2, the source is connected to M1 through
two parallel edges of capacities C1 and C2. We replaced these
two parallel edges by one edge of capacity C1+C2; while this
operation is without loss of generality if there are no security
constraints, it might be with loss of optimality under security
considerations, since the eavesdropper can now wiretap an
edge of capacity C1+C2, which is not possible in the case of
parallel edges. However, our outer bounds (proved to be tight)
are derived by considering the case where the eavesdropper
never wiretaps the edge of capacity C1 + C2. Hence, this
operation is without loss of generality also under security
considerations. A similar argument holds for the case of co-
located sinks, i.e., the two parallel edges of capacity C6 and C7
can be safely replaced by one edge of capacity C6+C7. Table I
also reports, for each analyzed network, the capacity regions
with and without security constraints, which are derived in the
rest of this section.
A. Butterfly Network 1
We start by considering the butterfly network 1 in Fig. 1
without security constraints. We notice that the rate region
in (1) is an outer bound on the capacity region of the butterfly
network 1 in Fig. 1 since: (i) the single rate constraints
in (1a) and (1b) are cut-constraints (from the max-flow min-
cut theorem) and (ii) the sum-rate constraints in (1c) and (1d)
follow from the GNS outer bound in [8, Theorem 2]. We now
show that the rate region in (1) is achievable. In particular,
Theorem III.1. For the butterfly network 1 in Fig. 1, the
following rate region is achievable:
R1 ≤ min (C1,C7) , (8a)
R2 ≤ min (C2,C6) , (8b)
R1 +R2 ≤ C3 +min (R2,C4,C5) , (8c)
R1 +R2 ≤ C3 +min (R1,C4,C5) . (8d)
It is not difficult to see that the rate regions in (8) and (1)
are equivalent. Hence, the rate region in (1) is the capacity
region for the butterfly network 1 in Fig. 1.
TABLE I: Networks of interest and their capacity regions with and without security constraints.
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S1 S2
M1
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D2 D1
C5C4
C2
C3
C1
C6 C7
Fig. 1: Butterfly
Network 1.
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Fig. 2: Butterfly
Network with
Co-Located Sources.
S1 S2
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D
C5C4
C2
C3
C1
C
6
+
C
7
Fig. 3: Butterfly
Network with
Co-Located Sinks.
S1 S2
M1
M2
D1 D2
C5C4
C2
C3
C1
C6C7
Fig. 4: Butterfly
Network 2.
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Se
cu
ri
ty R1 ≤ min {C1,C3,C7} ,
(1a)
R2 ≤ min {C2,C3,C6} ,
(1b)
R1 + R2 ≤ C3 + C4, (1c)
R1 + R2 ≤ C3 + C5. (1d)
R1≤C5+min {C1+C2,C3,C7} ,
(2a)
R2≤C4+min {C1+C2,C3,C6} ,
(2b)
R1 +R2≤C4+C5
+min {C1+C2,C3,C6+C7} .
(2c)
R1≤C4+min {C1,C3,C6+C7} ,
(3a)
R2≤C5+min {C2,C3,C6+C7} ,
(3b)
R1 +R2≤C4+C5
+min {C1+C2,C3,C6+C7} .
(3c)
R1 ≤ C4 +min {C1,C3,C7} ,
(4a)
R2 ≤ C5 +min {C2,C3,C6} ,
(4b)
R1 +R2 ≤ C4 + C5 + C3.
(4c)
W
ith
Se
cu
ri
ty
Secure communication is not
possible.
R1 ≤ min {C5,C1+C2,C3,C7} ,
(5a)
R2 ≤ min {C4,C1+C2,C3,C6} .
(5b)
R1 ≤ min {C1,C4} , (6a)
R2 ≤ min {C2,C5} , (6b)
R1 +R2 ≤ min {C3,C6 + C7} .
(6c)
R1 ≤ min {C4,C1,C3,C7} ,
(7a)
R2 ≤ min {C5,C2,C3,C6} ,
(7b)
R1 + R2 ≤ C3. (7c)
Proof: Without loss of generality, we assume R1 ≤ R2,
i.e., the constraint in (8c) is redundant. Consider a rate pair
(R1, R2) satisfying the constraints in (8). The transmission
scheme is as follows.
• Si, i ∈ [1 : 2] sends Ri packets on edge i, which is
possible thanks to the constraints in (8a) and (8b).
• The intermediate node M1 is responsible of two oper-
ations: (i) it first merges min {R1,C4,C5} packets re-
ceived from S1 with the same amount of packets received
from S2, which is possible since we are assuming R1 ≤
R2; after this first operation there are min {R1,C4,C5}
mixed packets and R1+R2−2min {R1,C4,C5} uncoded
packets (of which Ri −min {R1,C4,C5} were received
from Si, i ∈ [1 : 2]); (ii) it then sends both these types
of messages (i.e., coded and uncoded) on edge 3, which
is possible thanks to the constraint in (8d).
• The intermediate node M2 on edge 6 (respectively,
edge 7) sends: (i) R2 − min {R1,C4,C5} (respectively,
R1 − min {R1,C4,C5}) uncoded packets that were
transmitted by S2 (respectively, S1) and (ii) all the
min {R1,C4,C5} mixed packets received from M1; this
operation is possible thanks to the constraint in (8b), i.e.,
R2 ≤ C6 (respectively, constraint in (8a), i.e., R1 ≤ C7).
• Source S1 (respectively, S2) on edge 4 (respectively, edge
5) sends the min {R1,C4,C5} packets that were mixed
at the intermediate node M1; notice that this operation is
possible since min {R1,C4,C5} ≤ min {C4,C5}.
• Destination D1 on edge 7 receives R1−min (R1,C4,C5)
uncoded packets of S1 and min (R1,C4,C5) packets of
S1 mixed with same number of packets of S2, which are
also received (uncoded) on edge 5. Thus, node D1 can
recover the packets of S1 from the coded packets that it
receives on edge 7. Similarly, node D2 can successfully
decode all the packets that were sent by source S2.
We now consider the butterfly network 1 in Fig. 1 with
security constraints. In particular,
Theorem III.2. For the butterfly network 1 in Fig. 1, secure
communication is not possible.
Proof: We consider block coding with block length n and
secret message rate Rj , j ∈ [1 : 2]. With this, from the strong
secrecy requirement we obtain
nR1 ≤ H (W1) = I (W1;Y
n
1 ) +H (W1|Y
n
1 )
< ǫn +H (W1|Y
n
1 )
= I (W1;Y
n
2 , Y
n
5 |Y
n
1 ) +H (W1|Y
n
1 , Y
n
2 , Y
n
5 ) + ǫn
(a)
≤ I (W1;Y
n
2 , Y
n
5 |Y
n
1 ) +H (W1|Y
n
3 , Y
n
5 ) + ǫn
(b)
≤ I (W1;Y
n
2 , Y
n
5 |Y
n
1 ) +H (W1|Y
n
7 , Y
n
5 ) + ǫn
(c)
≤ I (W1;Y
n
2 , Y
n
5 |Y
n
1 ) + nǫn + ǫn
= H (Y n2 , Y
n
5 |Y
n
1 )−H (Y
n
2 , Y
n
5 |Y
n
1 ,W1)+nǫn+ǫn
(d)
≤ H (Y n2 , Y
n
5 |Y
n
1 )−H (Y
n
2 , Y
n
5 |Y
n
1 ,W1,Θ1)+nǫn+ǫn
(e)
= H (Y n2 , Y
n
5 |Y
n
1 )−H (Y
n
2 , Y
n
5 |W1,Θ1) + nǫn + ǫn
(f)
= H (Y n2 , Y
n
5 |Y
n
1 )−H (Y
n
2 , Y
n
5 ) + nǫn + ǫn
≤ nǫn + ǫn,
where: (i) the inequality in (a) follows since Y n3 is a determin-
istic function of (Y n1 , Y n2 ) and because of the ‘conditioning
reduces the entropy’ principle; (ii) the inequality in (b) follows
since Y n7 is a deterministic function of Y n3 and because of the
‘conditioning reduces the entropy’ principle; (iii) the inequal-
ity in (c) follows because of the decodability constraint; (iv)
the inequality in (d) is due to the ‘conditioning reduces the
entropy’ principle; (v) the equality in (e) follows since Y n1 is
a deterministic function of (W1,Θ1); (vi) finally, the equality
in (f) follows since (Y n2 , Y n5 ) is independent of (W1,Θ1). By
dividing both sides by n and taking the limit for n → ∞,
we get R1 = 0. By following similar steps, one can derive
R2 = 0. Hence, if do not have knowledge about the edge Eve
is wiretapping, then a secure communication over the butterfly
network 1 in Fig. 1 is not possible.
B. Butterfly Network with Co-Located Sources
We consider the butterfly network with co-located sources
in Fig. 2 with no security constraints. We notice that the rate
region in (2) is an outer bound on the capacity region of
the network in Fig. 2 since all the rate constraints are cut-
constraints (from the max-flow min-cut theorem). We now
show that the rate region in (2) is achievable. In particular,
Theorem III.3. For the butterfly network with co-located
sources in Fig. 2, the following rate region is achievable:
R1 ≤ C7 +min {R1,C5} , (9a)
R2 ≤ C6 +min {R2,C4} , (9b)
R1 +R2 ≤ min {C1 + C2,C3}+min {R2,C4}
+min {R1,C5} . (9c)
It is not difficult to see that the regions in (9) and (2) are
equivalent. Hence, the rate region in (2) is the capacity region
for the butterfly network with co-located sources in Fig. 2.
Proof: Consider a rate pair (R1, R2) satisfying the con-
straints in (9). The transmission scheme is as follows.
• The source sends min {R1,C5} packets for D1 on edge
5, which is possible since min {R1,C5} ≤ C5. Similarly,
the source sends min {R2,C4} packets for D2 on edge
4. Moreover, on the link of capacity (C1 + C2), the
source sends R1 − min {R1,C5} packets for D1 and
R2 − min {R2,C4} packets for D2. This operation is
possible thanks to the constraint in (9c).
• The intermediate node M1 simply sends the R1 −
min {R1,C5} packets for D1 and the R2−min {R2,C4}
packets for D2 on edge 3, which is possible thanks to the
constraint in (9c).
• The intermediate node M2 sends the R1 −min {R1,C5}
packets for D1 (received from M1) on edge 7, which is
possible thanks to the constraint in (9a). Similarly, M2
sends the R2 −min {R2,C4} packets for D2 on edge 6,
which is possible thanks to the constraint in (9b).
• Node D1 (respectively, D2) successfully recovers a total
of useful (i.e., those the source wished to explicitly com-
municate to D1) R1 (respectively, R2) uncoded packets.
We now consider the network in Fig. 2 with security
constraints. In particular,
Theorem III.4. For the butterfly network with co-located
sources in Fig. 2, the secure capacity region is given by (5)
in Table I.
Proof: We here prove that the rate region in (5) in Table I
is achievable. The proof that the rate region in (5) is also
an outer bound on the secure capacity region of the butterfly
network with co-located sources is reported in Appendix A.
Consider a secure rate pair (R1, R2) satisfying the constraints
in (5). The transmission scheme is as follows.
• The source sends K = max {R1, R2} random packets on
the edge of capacity C1 + C2. These packets are used to
generate a secret key. This operation is possible thanks
to the constraints in (5a) and in (5b).
• The intermediate node M1 simply sends the K random
packets on edge 3, which is possible thanks to the
constraints in (5a) and in (5b).
• The intermediate node M2 sends R1 random packets (out
the K ones received from M1) on edge 7, which we refer
to as K1. Similarly, out of the K random packets received
from M1, M2 sends R2 random packets on edge 6, which
we refer to as K2. These operations are possible thanks
to the constraints in (5a) and in (5b).
• The source sends R1 message packets for D1 encrypted
with the key K1 on edge 5 (possible because of (5a)).
Similarly, it sends R2 message packets for D2 encrypted
with the key K2 on edge 4 (possible because of (5b)).
• Node D1 (respectively, D2) receives R1 (respectively, R2)
encrypted useful packets from the source on edge 5 (re-
spectively, 4). Hence, by using the key K1 (respectively,
K2) received from M2, D1 (respectively, D2) successfully
recovers R1 (respectively, R2) uncoded packets.
C. Butterfly Network with Co-Located Sinks
We consider the butterfly network with co-located sinks as
shown in Fig. 3 without security constraints. An outer bound
on the capacity region of this network is the cut-set bound,
which is given in (3). We now design a transmission scheme
that achieves the outer bound in (3). In particular,
Theorem III.5. For the butterfly network with co-located sinks
in Fig. 3, the following rate region is achievable:
R1 ≤ C1 +min {R1,C4} , (10a)
R2 ≤ C2 +min {R2,C5} , (10b)
R1 +R2 ≤ min {C3,C6 + C7}+min {R2,C5}
+min {R1,C4} . (10c)
By straightforward manipulations, it is not difficult to see
that the rate regions in (10) and (3) are equivalent. Hence,
the rate region in (3) is the capacity region for the butterfly
network with co-located sinks in Fig. 3.
Proof: Consider a rate pair (R1, R2) satisfying the con-
straints in (10). The transmission scheme is as follows.
• Source S1 (respectively, S2) sends min {R1,C4} (respec-
tively, min {R2,C5}) packets on edge 4 (respectively,
edge 5). Moreover, S1 (respectively, S2) sends R1 −
min {R1,C4} (respectively, R2 −min {R2,C5}) packets
on edge 1 (respectively, edge 2). These operations are
possible thanks to the constraints in (10a) and in (10b).
• The intermediate nodes M1 and M2 simply send the R1−
min {R1,C4} packets of S1 and the R2 −min {R2,C5}
packets of S2 on edge 3 and on the edge of capacity
C6+C7. This is possible thanks to the constraint in (10c).
• The destination successfully receives R1 uncoded packets
sent by S1 and R2 uncoded packets sent by S2.
We now consider the network in Fig. 3 with security
constraints. In particular
Theorem III.6. For the butterfly network with co-located sinks
in Fig. 3, the secure capacity region is given in (6) in Table I.
Proof: We here prove that the rate region in (6) in
Table I is achievable. The proof of the converse is provided in
Appendix B. Consider a secure rate pair (R1, R2) satisfying
the constraints in (6). The transmission scheme is as follows.
• Source S1 (respectively, S2) sends R1 (respectively, R2)
random packets on edge 1 (respectively, 2). These packets
are used in the generation of the secret key and we refer
to them to as K1 (respectively, K2). These operations
are possible thanks to the constraints in (6a) and in (6b).
Moreover, S1 (respectively, S2) sends R1 (respectively,
R2) message packets encrypted with the key K1 (re-
spectively, K2) on edge 4 (respectively, edge 5). This
is possible because of (6a) and (6b).
• The intermediate nodes M1 and M2 simply send the
R1 + R2 random packets on edge 3 and on the edge
of capacity C6 + C7, respectively. These operations are
possible because of the constraints in (6c).
• The destination receives R1 encrypted packets of S1 on
edge 4 and R2 encrypted packets of S2 on edge 5.
Moreover, it also receives the keys K1 and K2 on the
edge of capacity C6 + C7. Hence, by using the keys
K1 and K2, it successfully recovers R1 and R2 uncoded
packets of S1 and S2, respectively.
D. Butterfly Network 2
The last network we consider is the buttefly network 2 in
Fig. 4, which differs from the buttefly network 1 in Fig. 1 since
each source is also directly connected to the corresponding
destination. The rate region in (4) is an outer bound on
the capacity region of the butterfly network 2, where each
constraint follows from the max-flow min-cut theorem. We
now show that the rate region in (4) is achievable. In particular,
Theorem III.7. For the butterfly network 2 in Fig. 4, the
following rate region is achievable:
R1 ≤ min {C1,C7}+min {R1,C4} , (11a)
R2 ≤ min {C2,C6}+min {R2,C5} , (11b)
R1 +R2 ≤ C3 +min {R2,C5}+min {R1,C4} . (11c)
It is not difficult to see that the rate regions in (11) and (4)
are equivalent. Hence, the rate region in (4) is the capacity
region for the butterfly network 2 in Fig. 4.
Proof: Consider a rate pair (R1, R2) satisfying the con-
straints in (11). The transmission scheme is as follows.
• Source S1 (respectively, S2) sends min {R1,C4} (respec-
tively, min {R2,C5}) packets on edge 4 (respectively,
edge 5). Moreover, S1 (respectively, S2) sends R1 −
min {R1,C4} (respectively, R2 −min {R2,C5}) packets
on edge 1 (respectively, edge 2). These operations are
possible thanks to the constraints in (11a) and in (11b).
• The intermediate node M1 sends R1 − min {R1,C4}
packets of S1 and R2 − min {R2,C5} packets of S2
on edge 3, which is possible because of the constraint
in (11c).
• The intermediate node M2 sends R1 − min {R1,C4}
packets of S1 on edge 7. Similarly, M2 sends R2 −
min {R2,C5} packets of S2 on edge 6. These opera-
tions are possible thanks to the constraints in (11a) and
in (11b).
• Node D1 (respectively, D2) receives R1 (respectively, R2)
uncoded packets of S1 (respectively, S2).
We now consider the network in Fig. 4 with security
constraints. In particular,
Theorem III.8. For the butterfly network 2 in Fig. 4, the
secure capacity region is given in (7) in Table I.
Proof: We here prove that the rate region in (7) in
Table I is achievable. The proof of the converse is provided in
Appendix C. Consider a secure rate pair (R1, R2) satisfying
the constraints in (7). The transmission scheme is as follows.
• Source S1 (respectively, S2) sends R1 (respectively, R2)
random packets on edge 1 (respectively, 2). These packets
are used in the secret key generation and we refer to
them to as K1 (respectively, K2). Moreover, S1 (respec-
tively, S2) sends R1 (respectively, R2) message packets
encrypted with the key K1 (respectively, K2) on edge 4
(respectively, 5). These operations are possible thanks to
the constraints in (7a) and in (7b).
• The intermediate node M1 simply sends the R1 + R2
random packets (K1 and K2) on edge 3. This operation
is possible because of (7c).
• The intermediate node M2 sends the R1 random packets
of S1, i.e., K1, on edge 7. Similarly, it sends the R2
random packets of S2, i.e., K2, on edge 6. This is possible
because of the constraints in (7a) and (7b).
• The destination D1 (respectively, D2) receives R1 (re-
spectively, R2) encrypted message packets of S1 (respec-
tively, S2). It also receives the key K1 (respectively, K2)
on edge 7 (respectively, 6). Hence, by using K1 (respec-
tively, K2), it successfully decodes R1 (respectively, R2)
uncoded packets of S1 (respectively, S2).
IV. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In this paper we characterized the capacity of four two-
unicast networks which are derived from the well-known
butterfly network. In particular, we analyzed these networks
with and without security constraints. Based on our analysis,
we can draw the following conclusions.
1) There exist networks for which network coding op-
erations are needed (for capacity characterization) in
absence of security, but they do not provide any benefit
under security constraints.
2) There are networks for which coding across sessions is
not beneficial without security, but it becomes crucial
with security considerations (see butterfly network with
co-located sources).
3) Cooperation among sources and sinks increases the
throughput both with and without security. We also
observe that in case of security, if given an option
of choosing between co-located sources or co-located
destinations, the former brings higher throughput gains
in case of uniform edge capacities. The results in this
paper only consider the ultimate cooperation, i.e., we
analyzed the case when the cooperation edge (between
the two sources and the two sinks) is of infinite capacity
(i.e., co-located nodes). Understanding how the rate
advantages change with respect to the strength (finite
capacity) of the cooperation link is an important open
question, which is object of current investigation.
The capacity characterization for a general multiple-unicast
network is a long-standing open problem. Several transmission
schemes can be envisaged, one of which considers the butterfly
network as a building block. Hence, by means of the closed-
form expression capacity result for the butterfly network
(as well as for the networks derived from it) with general
edge capacities, high-throughput achieving strategies for a
general multiple-unicast network can be designed both with
and without security constraints.
APPENDIX A
We consider block coding with block length n and secret
message rate Rj , j ∈ [1 : 2]. We let Xn2 , Y n2 and Zn2 be
the signal transmitted by the source on the edge of capacity
C1 + C2, the signal received by M1 and the signal received
by the possible eavesdropper on the edge of capacity C1+C2,
respectively. With this we have
nR1 ≤ H (W1) = I (W1;Y
n
5 ) +H (W1|Y
n
5 )
(a)
< ǫn +H (W1|Y
n
5 )
= I (W1;Y
n
7 |Y
n
5 ) +H (W1|Y
n
5 , Y
n
7 ) + ǫn
(b)
≤ I (W1;Y
n
7 |Y
n
5 ) + nǫn + ǫn
(c)
≤ H (Y n7 |Y
n
5 ) + nǫn + ǫn
(d)
≤ H (Y n7 ) + nǫn + ǫn ≤ nC7 + nǫn + ǫn, (12)
where: (i) the inequality in (a) follows because of the strong
secrecy requirement; (ii) the inequality in (b) follows because
of the decodability constraint; (iii) the inequality in (c) follows
because the entropy of a discrete random variable is a non-
negative quantity; (iv) finally, the inequality in (d) is due to the
‘conditioning reduces the entropy’ principle. By substituting
the subscript 5 with 7 and vice versa in the above derivation,
one can get the constraint nR1 ≤ nC5 + nǫn + ǫn. By means
of similar steps, we obtain
nR1 < I (W1;Y
n
3 |Y
n
5 ) +H (W1|Y
n
3 , Y
n
5 ) + ǫn
(a)
≤ I (W1;Y
n
3 |Y
n
5 ) +H (W1|Y
n
7 , Y
n
5 ) + ǫn
(b)
≤ I (W1;Y
n
3 |Y
n
5 ) + nǫn + ǫn
(c)
≤ H (Y n3 ) + nǫn + ǫn ≤ nC3 + nǫn + ǫn, (13)
where: (i) the inequality in (a) follows since Y n7 is a determin-
istic function of Y n3 and because of the ‘conditioning reduces
the entropy’ principle; (ii) the inequality in (b) follows because
of the decodability constraint; (iii) finally, the inequality in
(c) follows because the entropy of a discrete random variable
is non-negative and because of the ‘conditioning reduces the
entropy’ principle. By means of similar steps, we obtain
nR1 < I (W1;Y
n
2 |Y
n
5 ) +H (W1|Y
n
2 , Y
n
5 ) + ǫn
(a)
≤ I (W1;Y
n
2 |Y
n
5 ) +H (W1|Y
n
3 , Y
n
5 ) + ǫn
(b)
≤ I (W1;Y
n
2 |Y
n
5 ) + nǫn + ǫn
(c)
≤ H (Y n2 ) + nǫn + ǫn ≤ n (C1 + C2) + nǫn + ǫn,
(14)
where: (i) the inequality in (a) follows since Y n3 is a determin-
istic function of Y n2 and because of the ‘conditioning reduces
the entropy’ principle; (ii) the inequality in (b) follows from
steps (a) and (b) in (13); (iii) finally, the inequality in (c)
follows because the entropy of a discrete random variable is a
non-negative quantity and because of the ‘conditioning reduces
the entropy’ principle.
By dividing both sides of the above inequalities by n and by
taking the limit for n→∞, we get the constraint in (5a). By
following similar steps, one can derive the constraint in (5b).
APPENDIX B
We consider block coding with block length n and secret
message rate Rj , j ∈ [1 : 2]. We let Xn6 , Y n6 and Zn6 be
the signal transmitted by M2, the signals received by the
destination and by the possible eavesdropper on the edge of
capacity C6 + C7, respectively. With this we have
nR1 ≤ H (W1) = I (W1;Y
n
4 ) +H (W1|Y
n
4 )
(a)
< I (W1;Y
n
5 , Y
n
6 |Y
n
4 ) + nǫn + ǫn
(b)
≤ I (W1;Y
n
5 , Y
n
3 |Y
n
4 ) + nǫn + ǫn
(c)
≤ I (W1;Y
n
1 , Y
n
2 , Y
n
5 |Y
n
4 )+nǫn+ǫn
(d)
≤ H (Y n1 , Y
n
2 , Y
n
5 |Y
n
4 )−H (Y
n
1 , Y
n
2 , Y
n
5 |Y
n
4 ,W1,Θ1)
+ nǫn + ǫn
(e)
= H (Y n1 , Y
n
2 , Y
n
5 |Y
n
4 )−H (Y
n
1 , Y
n
2 , Y
n
5 |W1,Θ1)
+ nǫn + ǫn
(f)
= H (Y n2 , Y
n
5 |Y
n
4 )−H (Y
n
2 , Y
n
5 )+H (Y
n
1 |Y
n
2 , Y
n
4 , Y
n
5 )
−H (Y n1 |W1,Θ1, Y
n
2 , Y
n
5 ) + nǫn + ǫn
(g)
≤ H (Y n1 |Y
n
2 , Y
n
4 , Y
n
5 )−H (Y
n
1 |W1,Θ1, Y
n
2 , Y
n
5 )
+ nǫn + ǫn
(h)
≤ H (Y n1 ) + nǫn + ǫn ≤ nC1 + nǫn + ǫn, (15)
where: (i) the inequality in (a) follows because of the strong
secrecy and the decodability constraints; (ii) the inequality in
(b) follows because of the ‘conditioning reduces the entropy’
principle and since Y n6 is uniquely determined given Y n3 ; (iii)
the inequality in (c) follows because of the ‘conditioning
reduces the entropy’ principle and since Y n3 is uniquely
determined given (Y n1 , Y n2 ); (iv) the inequality in (d) is due
to the ‘conditioning reduces the entropy’ principle; (v) the
equality in (e) follows since Y n4 is a deterministic function
of (W1,Θ1); (vi) the equality in (f) follows since (Y n2 , Y n5 )
is independent of (W1,Θ1); (vii) the inequality in (g) is
due to the ‘conditioning reduces the entropy’ principle; (viii)
finally, the inequality in (h) follows since the entropy of a
discrete random variable is non-negative and because of the
‘conditioning reduces the entropy’ principle. By means of
similar steps as in (15) we obtain
nR1 ≤ H (W1) = I (W1;Y
n
1 ) +H (W1|Y
n
1 )
< I (W1;Y
n
2 , Y
n
4 , Y
n
5 |Y
n
1 ) + nǫn + ǫn
≤ H (Y n4 |Y
n
1 , Y
n
2 , Y
n
5 )−H (Y
n
4 |W1,Θ1, Y
n
2 , Y
n
5 )
+ nǫn + ǫn
≤ H (Y n4 ) + nǫn + ǫn ≤ nC4 + nǫn + ǫn. (16)
We now prove the outer bound in (6c). In particular, we have
n (R1 +R2) ≤ H (W1,W2)
= I (W1,W2;Y
n
4 , Y
n
5 ) +H (W1,W2|Y
n
4 , Y
n
5 )
(a)
< I (W1,W2;Y
n
5 |Y
n
4 ) +H (W1,W2|Y
n
4 , Y
n
5 ) + ǫn
(b)
≤ H (Y n5 |Y
n
4 )−H (Y
n
5 |W1,Θ1,W2)
+H (W1,W2|Y
n
4 , Y
n
5 ) + ǫn
(c)
≤ I (W2;Y
n
5 |W1,Θ1) +H (W1,W2|Y
n
4 , Y
n
5 ) + ǫn
(d)
= I (W2;W1,Θ1|Y
n
5 ) + I (W2;Y
n
5 )
+H (W1,W2|Y
n
4 , Y
n
5 ) + ǫn
(e)
≤ H (W1,Θ1|Y
n
5 )−H (W1,Θ1|W2,Θ2)
+ I (W2;Y
n
5 ) +H (W1,W2|Y
n
4 , Y
n
5 ) + ǫn
(f)
< H (W1,W2|Y
n
4 , Y
n
5 ) + 2ǫn
(g)
≤ I (W1,W2;Y
n
6 |Y
n
4 , Y
n
5 ) + nǫn + 2ǫn
(h)
≤ H (Y n6 ) + nǫn + 2ǫn ≤ n (C6 + C7) + nǫn + ǫn, (17)
where: (i) the inequality in (a) follows because of the strong
secrecy constraint; (ii) the inequality in (b) is due to the
‘conditioning reduces the entropy’ principle and since Y n4 is a
deterministic function of (W1,Θ1); (iii) the inequality in (c) is
due to the ‘conditioning reduces the entropy’ principle and to
the fact that Y n5 is independent of (W1,Θ1); (iv) the equality
in (d) follows since W2 is independent of (W1,Θ1); (v) the
inequality in (e) follows because of the ‘conditioning reduces
the entropy’ principle and because Y n5 is uniquely determined
given (W2,Θ2); (vi) the inequality in (f) follows because of
the strong secrecy constraint, because (W1,Θ1) is independent
of (W2,Θ2) and because of the ‘conditioning reduces the
entropy’ principle; (vii) the inequality in (g) follows from
the decodability constraint; (viii) finally, the inequality in (h)
follows since the entropy of a discrete random variable is non-
negative and because of the ‘conditioning reduces the entropy’
principle. Similarly,
n (R1 +R2)
(a)
≤ I (W1,W2;Y
n
6 |Y
n
4 , Y
n
5 ) + nǫn + 2ǫn
(b)
≤ I (W1,W2;Y
n
3 |Y
n
4 , Y
n
5 ) + nǫn + 2ǫn
(c)
≤ H (Y n3 ) + nǫn + 2ǫn ≤ nC3 + nǫn + ǫn, (18)
where: (i) the inequality in (a) follows from the steps (a)-
(g) in (17); (ii) the inequality in (b) follows because of the
‘conditioning reduces the entropy’ principle and since Y n6 is
uniquely determined given Y n3 ; (iii) finally, the inequality in
(c) follows since the entropy of a discrete random variable
is non-negative and because of the ‘conditioning reduces the
entropy’ principle.
By dividing both sides of the above inequalities by n and
by taking the limit for n→∞, we get the constraints in (6a)
and in (6c). By following similar steps as in (15) and in (16),
one can derive the constraint on R2 in (6b).
APPENDIX C
We consider block coding with block length n and secret
message rate Rj , j ∈ [1 : 2]. By following similar steps
as in (12) with: (i) the subscript 5 replaced by 4, it is
straightforward to prove nR1 ≤ nC7 + nǫn + ǫn; (ii) the
subscript 5 replaced by 7 and the subscript 7 replaced by 4, it
is straightforward to prove nR1 ≤ nC4 +nǫn + ǫn. Similarly,
by following the same steps as in (13) with the subscript 5
replaced by 4, one can easily prove nR1 ≤ nC3 + nǫn + ǫn.
Moreover, we have
nR1 ≤ H (W1) = I (W1;Y
n
4 ) +H (W1|Y
n
4 )
(a)
< I (W1;Y
n
7 |Y
n
4 ) + nǫn + ǫn
(b)
≤ I (W1;Y
n
3 |Y
n
4 ) + nǫn + ǫn
(c)
≤ I (W1;Y
n
1 , Y
n
2 |Y
n
4 ) + nǫn + ǫn
(d)
≤ H (Y n1 , Y
n
2 |Y
n
4 )−H (Y
n
1 , Y
n
2 |Y
n
4 ,W1,Θ1)
+ nǫn + ǫn
(e)
≤ H (Y n1 , Y
n
2 |Y
n
4 )−H (Y
n
1 , Y
n
2 |W1,Θ1)
+ nǫn + ǫn
(f)
= H (Y n2 |Y
n
4 )−H (Y
n
2 ) +H (Y
n
1 |Y
n
2 , Y
n
4 )
−H (Y n1 |W1,Θ1, Y
n
2 ) + nǫn + ǫn
(g)
≤ H (Y n1 |Y
n
2 , Y
n
4 )−H (Y
n
1 |W1,Θ1, Y
n
2 ) + nǫn + ǫn
(h)
≤ H (Y n1 ) + nǫn + ǫn ≤ nC1 + nǫn + ǫn, (19)
(i) the inequality in (a) follows because of the strong secrecy
and the decodability constraints; (ii) the inequality in (b)
follows because of the ‘conditioning reduces the entropy’
principle and since Y n7 is uniquely determined given Y n3 ;
(iii) the inequality in (c) follows because of the ‘conditioning
reduces the entropy’ principle and since Y n3 is uniquely deter-
mined given (Y n1 , Y n2 ); (iv) the inequality in (d) is due to the
‘conditioning reduces the entropy’ principle; (v) the equality in
(e) follows since Y n4 is a deterministic function of (W1,Θ1);
(vi) the equality in (f) follows since Y n2 is independent of
(W1,Θ1); (vii) the inequality in (g) is due to the ‘conditioning
reduces the entropy’ principle; (viii) finally, the inequality in
(h) follows since the entropy of a discrete random variable
is non-negative and because of the ‘conditioning reduces the
entropy’ principle.
We now prove the sum-rate outer bound in (7c). We have
n (R1 +R2)
(a)
< H (W1,W2|Y
n
4 , Y
n
5 ) + 2ǫn
(b)
≤ I (W1,W2;Y
n
6 , Y
n
7 |Y
n
4 , Y
n
5 ) + nǫn + 2ǫn
(c)
≤ I (W1,W2;Y
n
3 |Y
n
4 , Y
n
5 ) + nǫn + 2ǫn
(d)
≤ H (Y n3 ) + nǫn + 2ǫn ≤ nC3 + nǫn + 2ǫn, (20)
where: (i) the inequality in (a) follows by similar steps as
in (a)-(f) in (17); (ii) the inequality in (b) follows from
the decodability constraint; (iii) the inequality in (c) follows
because of the ‘conditioning reduces the entropy’ principle
and since (Y n6 , Y n7 ) is uniquely determined given Y n3 ; (iv)
finally, the inequality in (d) follows since the entropy of a
discrete random variable is non-negative and because of the
‘conditioning reduces the entropy’ principle.
By dividing both sides of the above inequalities by n and by
taking the limit for n→∞, we get the constraints in (7a) and
in (7c). By following similar steps as done for deriving (7a),
one can derive the constraint on R2 in (7b).
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